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Abstract 
 
We exploit a setting where firms provide two forecasts of the same underlying metric – effective tax rates 
(ETRs) – to examine the interaction between voluntary and mandatory disclosures. The integral method 
(ASC 740-270) requires firms to forecast de facto annual ETRs while some firms additionally provide 
voluntary ETR forecasts in earnings calls. Using a self-constructed dataset of voluntary ETR forecasts, we 
document that managers are more likely to issue voluntary ETR forecasts when tax complexity is higher. 
More importantly, voluntary ETR forecasts are incrementally informative over mandatory ETR forecasts 
as analysts revise their ETR forecasts based on the news in voluntary ETR forecasts, especially for 
voluntary non-GAAP ETR forecasts and in the presence of discrete tax items. Overall, our results suggest 
that managers resort to voluntary disclosure when mandatory disclosure constrains their ability to convey 
private information, thus we offer new insights on the interaction between voluntary and mandatory 
forward-looking disclosures.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In this study, we exploit a setting where firms provide two forecasts of the same 
underlying metric – the effective tax rate (ETR) – to examine the interaction between voluntary 
and mandatory forward-looking disclosures and how tax information is communicated to 
outsiders. Under ASC 740-270, firms are required to use the integral method to compute tax 
expense for interim reporting periods. In each interim quarter, managers forecast the full-year 
annualized tax rate based on realized and projected pretax income and compute quarterly tax 
expense using the full-year ETR estimate. Accordingly, the year-to-date ETR represents a de 
facto mandatory annual ETR forecast.1 In addition to the mandatory ETR forecast, some firms 
also voluntarily provide ETR forecasts in earnings conference calls (see Appendix A for 
examples). The co-existence of both mandatory and voluntary ETR forecasts allows us to 
examine managerial incentives behind the voluntary disclosure decision and the interplay 
between voluntary and mandatory disclosures. Specifically, we first explore why firms 
voluntarily provide ETR forecasts in conference calls when ASC 740-270 already mandates ETR 
forecasts. We then assess the informativeness of voluntary and mandatory ETR forecasts by 
examining the extent to which analysts ETR forecast revisions incorporate the two forecasts. 
We conjecture that firms provide voluntary ETR forecasts for two reasons. First, 
theoretical work on the interaction between voluntary and mandatory disclosures predicts that the 
probability of voluntary disclosure increases with the level of noise in mandatory disclosure, and 
that voluntary disclosure is more likely when the mandatory disclosure regime is less flexible 
(Einhorn 2005). Under the integral method, tax effects of unusual or infrequent items, referred to 
                                                          
1 See Bratten et al. (2017) Appendix A for a more detailed explanation of the integral method. Note that the year-to-
date ETR represents a de facto mandatory annual ETR forecast only for interim quarters (not the case for the fourth 
quarter, see Figure 1 for details). 
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as “discrete items,” must be recognized in the quarter they occur.2 As such, in the presence of 
discrete items, the mandatory ETR forecast is a noisy proxy for the ETR that managers expect to 
apply for the rest of the year, and managers do not have much flexibility to communicate their 
expected ETR via mandatory disclosure (i.e., financial statements). The noise and lack of 
discretion in mandatory ETR forecasts provide managers incentives to voluntarily disclose a less 
noisy ETR estimate. Second, investors and analysts view disaggregated management guidance 
(earnings and its components) as more credible than aggregated guidance (earnings alone) (e.g., 
Hutton et al. 2003; Hirst et al. 2007; Merkley et al. 2013). Because voluntary ETR forecast is a 
form of disaggregated management guidance, providing such forecast responds to capital 
markets’ demand for granular account-level information and enhances the credibility of 
management earnings guidance. 
To assess the informativeness of voluntary ETR forecasts, we examine the extent to 
which analysts incorporate voluntary and mandatory ETR forecasts into their ETR forecast 
revisions. Compared to mandatory ETR forecasts restricted by the integral method, managers 
have more discretion in conveying their private tax information via voluntary disclosure. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that analysts update their ETR forecasts based on management 
voluntary ETR forecasts.3 In addition, prior research shows that analysts do not fully understand 
the tax accounts which are governed by a complex set of rules, so voluntary ETR forecasts could 
potentially help analysts form more accurate ETR forecasts (e.g., Chen and Schoderbek 2000; 
Plumlee 2003; Weber 2009; Donelson et al. 2018).  
                                                          
2 See Appendix B for a list of common discrete items and related discussions from earnings conference calls. 
3 For example, Value Line analyst Mario Ferro issued a report on the outlook of Hasbro, Inc. (HAS) highlighting 
management’s full-year ETR forecast of 17% and his ETR forecast was revised downward from 23% to 17% 
accordingly (May 4th, 2018). In addition, on April 6th, 2018, Value Line analyst Michael Ratty issued a report on 
Merck & Co (MRK) commenting on management’s going-forward ETR forecast of 19%-20% as persistent through 
the past few years. His ETR forecast was 19%, consistent with the management forecast.   
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Nonetheless, Hutton et al. (2012) find that management earnings guidance is more 
accurate than analyst earnings forecasts only about 50% of the time, suggesting that managers do 
not always have better information. Bratten et al. (2017) document that 74% of the time analyst 
ETR forecasts differ from mandatory ETR forecasts by more than 0.5%, suggesting that analysts 
do not always rely on management when forming ETR forecasts. In addition, when firm 
performance closely comoves with macroeconomic factors (e.g., interest rates, foreign exchange 
rates, tax law changes), analysts may obtain insights from in-house macroeconomic experts and 
produce more accurate forecasts than managers (Hutton et al. 2012).4 Analysts can also become 
knowledgeable about firm-level income taxes by conducting extensive tax-specific research 
(e.g., Bratten et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2018). Finally, in earnings calls management might simply 
re-iterate information already embedded in mandatory ETR forecasts. Overall, whether voluntary 
ETR forecasts are informative to analysts beyond mandatory ETR forecasts remains an empirical 
question. 
To answer our research questions, we construct a detailed dataset, including the value, 
forecast horizon, and type of management voluntary ETR forecast, from conference call 
transcripts between 2006 and 2016. Because mandatory ETR forecasts are by definition 
annualized measures, our analyses focus on voluntary annual ETR forecasts. We first find that 
22.6% of firm-quarters provide voluntary annual ETR forecasts. Among these observations, 
22.1% are non-GAAP-based ETR forecasts, 9.5% are GAAP-based, and the rest are 
unspecified.5 We find that the probability of providing voluntary ETR forecasts is positively 
related to the firm’s tax complexity (for example, the presence of discrete items and tax haven 
                                                          
4 For example, see Goldman Sachs Asset Management research report on the effect of U.S. tax reform on corporate 
pension.(https://www.gsam.com/content/gsam/us/en/institutions/market-insights/gsam-insights/pension-
solutions/2018/us-tax-reform-impact-on-corporate-pensions.html)  
5  The unspecified ETR forecasts could be GAAP or non-GAAP based. Our study is agnostic about whether 
unspecified ETR forecasts represent GAAP or non-GAAP based metrics.  
4 
 
operations), information environment, and disclosure practice. As we dive deeper into firms that 
provide voluntary ETR forecasts and focus on the type of the forecast, we find that firms with 
higher tax complexity are more likely to provide non-GAAP ETR forecasts. This finding is 
consistent with the prediction in Einhorn (2005) that voluntary disclosure is more likely when 
mandatory disclosure contains more noise and when the mandatory disclosure regime is less 
flexible. 
To assess the informativeness of voluntary ETR forecasts, we examine whether analyst 
ETR forecast revisions around earnings calls impound the news contained in voluntary and 
mandatory ETR forecasts. Because issuing voluntary ETR forecasts is a firm decision, we use 
the Heckman two-stage approach to correct for self-selection. We find that analysts revise their 
ETR forecasts based on the news contained in voluntary ETR forecasts, controlling for 
mandatory ETR forecast news, suggesting that voluntary ETR forecasts provide new information 
to analysts and managers do not simply reiterate their mandatory ETR forecasts in earnings calls. 
More importantly, analyst ETR forecast revisions are more strongly associated with the news 
contained in voluntary ETR forecasts compared to mandatory ETR forecasts, suggesting that 
analysts assign a greater weight to voluntary ETR forecasts when forming their ETR 
expectations. Looking at different types of voluntary ETR forecasts, we find that all three types 
(non-GAAP, GAAP, and unspecified) are incrementally informative over mandatory ETR 
forecasts, and there is suggestive evidence that analysts find non-GAAP voluntary ETR forecasts 
the most informative. Overall, our results show that despite the existence of mandatory ETR 
forecasts, voluntary ETR forecasts represent an important channel through which firms convey 
tax-related information to outsiders.  
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We further conduct several tests to pinpoint situations where voluntary ETR forecasts 
could be particularly informative. First, under the integral method, discrete items are required to 
be recorded in full in the quarter they occur, adding noise to mandatory ETR forecasts (Bratten et 
al. 2017). Hence, we expect voluntary ETR forecasts to be more useful when the firm quarter 
reports discrete items. We find evidence consistent with voluntary ETR forecasts being more 
informative than mandatory ETR forecasts when there are discrete tax items, suggesting that 
analysts resort to voluntary ETR forecasts when mandatory ETR forecasts appear to be 
“polluted.” Therefore, based on our findings, voluntary disclosure becomes an important channel 
for managers to convey tax-related information when they do not have the discretion to do so via 
mandatory disclosure, consistent with the theoretical prediction in Einhorn (2005). 
Second, we partition our sample based on whether analysts’ ETR forecasts mimic 
management mandatory ETR forecasts.6 Bratten et al. (2017) report that analysts’ ETR forecasts 
deviate from mandatory ETR forecasts 74% of the time, so we aim to shed light on the following 
question: when analysts do not follow managers’ mandatory ETR forecasts, where do they obtain 
tax information? We find that when analysts do not mimic managers’ mandatory ETR forecasts, 
their ETR forecast revisions are still strongly associated with the information contained in 
voluntary ETR forecasts. Thus, despite that analysts might ignore mandatory ETR forecasts and 
obtain tax information through their own research efforts, we show that voluntary ETR forecasts 
remain an important information source for analysts to form ETR expectations.      
After establishing that analysts respond to voluntary ETR forecasts, we examine whether 
voluntary ETR forecasts are associated with improved analyst ETR forecast accuracy. We find a 
positive relation between post-conference call (hereafter, post-call) analyst ETR forecast 
                                                          
6 Here we classify analyst forecasts as “non-mimicking” forecasts if the absolute difference between the consensus 
analyst ETR forecast and management mandatory ETR forecast is larger than 0.5%, following Bratten et al. (2017). 
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accuracy and voluntary ETR forecast accuracy, controlling for mandatory ETR forecast 
accuracy and pre-conference call (hereafter, pre-call) analyst ETR forecast accuracy. Hence, 
despite that managers have incentives to bias voluntary disclosure (e.g., Rogers and Stocken 
2005; Cotter et al. 2006), our result is consistent with managers issuing voluntary ETR forecasts 
mainly to inform outsiders.  
In supplementary analyses, we verify that our main result continues to hold after 
controlling for news contained in management earnings guidance and analyst earnings forecast 
revisions, suggesting that voluntary ETR forecast has its own distinctive information content that 
is not subsumed by the information contained in earnings guidance. We also partition our sample 
by fiscal quarter and by voluntary ETR forecast frequency. Our main inference that voluntary 
ETR forecasts are incrementally informative over mandatory ETR forecasts continues to hold in 
all partitions. We find some suggestive evidence that voluntary ETR forecasts are more 
informative when issued in the first quarter and when issued frequently.  
Our study contributes to three streams of literature. First, we answer the call in Beyer et 
al. (2010) to examine the interaction between voluntary and mandatory disclosures. One stream 
of research in this area focuses on the confirmatory role of mandatory disclosure (e.g., Gigler and 
Hemmer 1998; Ball et al. 2012). Mandatory financial reports, although not timely, increases the 
credibility of voluntary disclosure through subsequent verification, leading to a positive relation 
between the quality of mandatory disclosure and the quality and likelihood of voluntary 
disclosure. Another stream of research studies managers’ voluntary disclosure choices when 
mandatory disclosure is noisy or is restricted by accounting rules (e.g., Einhorn 2005; Guay et al. 
2016). Our study contributes to the latter research stream by showing that voluntary disclosure is 
more likely when the mandatorily disclosed signal contains more noise. We also show that 
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voluntary ETR forecasts provide incremental information to analysts, suggesting that managers 
use their discretion to mitigate the deficiencies in mandatory disclosure. Our finding also has 
implications for accounting standard setters as we show that when accounting rules limit the 
usefulness of certain mandatory metrics, managers could mitigate the noise in mandatory 
disclosure by voluntarily disclosing their private information. 
In addition, we contribute to the research stream on analysts’ understanding of income 
taxes and how tax information is communicated to market participants. Earlier research generally 
finds that analysts do not assimilate tax-related information (Plumlee 2003; Chen and 
Schoderbek 2000; Weber 2009), while more recent research finds that analysts provide 
informative tax forecasts (Baik et al. 2016; Bratten et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2018; Mauler 2019). 
A natural question arises as to how analysts obtain tax-related information. Because of the 
complexity of the tax account, management input is arguably important in helping outsiders 
better understand taxes. However, our understanding of how firms communicate tax information, 
especially in a voluntary disclosure setting, is limited. Our study fills this void by providing 
direct evidence of management voluntary ETR forecasts influencing analyst ETR forecast 
activity. Our findings can be interpreted together with those in Bratten et al. (2017), who show 
that analysts are less likely to follow management mandatory ETR forecasts when there are 
discrete items, and their ETR forecasts are relatively more accurate when tax complexity is 
higher. Our results suggest that analysts derive their ETR forecasts from management voluntary 
ETR forecasts, especially when there are discrete tax items (i.e., tax complexity is higher), and 
when they do not follow managers’ mandatory ETR forecasts. 
We also contribute to the literature on non-GAAP reporting. Prior studies show that non-
GAAP earnings are on average more informative than GAAP earnings (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 
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2003; Bradshaw et al. 2018). These studies generally focus on the difference between voluntarily 
disclosed non-GAAP metrics and mandatory GAAP metrics. Little is known about voluntarily 
disclosed GAAP metrics. Our detailed voluntary ETR forecast data enables us to examine 
managers’ choice of GAAP or non-GAAP metrics (i.e., GAAP and non-GAAP ETR forecasts) in 
a voluntary disclosure setting. In addition, prior non-GAAP studies focus on reported current 
period performance, while we offer new evidence on the informativeness of forward-looking 
non-GAAP and GAAP disclosures. Finally, we examine the link between management non-
GAAP forecasts and analyst forecasts, hence offering indirect evidence on managers’ role in 
shaping street earnings (Bradshaw 2011). 
In a concurrent study, Koutney (2018) examines whether analysts improve on 
management voluntary ETR forecasts. He focuses on analyst ETR forecasts that deviate from 
managers’ voluntary ETR forecasts and concludes that analysts do not add useful information. 
Our study differs from Koutney (2018) in two fundamental respects. First, we are interested in 
whether voluntary ETR forecasts convey incremental information over mandatory ETR 
forecasts. As both mandatory and voluntary disclosures are important channels through which 
managers convey information to outsiders, our study provides new insights on the interactions 
between voluntary and mandatory disclosure and how analysts gather tax-related knowledge. 
Second, Koutney (2018) assumes that management voluntary ETR forecasts are on a non-GAAP 
basis. However, as we discuss in more detail in Section 3.1 and Appendix A, our study 
separately examines the determinants and information content of GAAP and non-GAAP ETR 
forecasts. Overall, we view both papers as complementary studies on the important question of 
income taxes and financial reporting. 
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We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Section II discusses the related prior 
literature and develops hypotheses. Section III describes the data collection process, research 
design, and key variables. Section IV presents empirical results and Section V concludes. 
II. PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 The interaction between voluntary and mandatory disclosures and the decision to 
provide voluntary ETR forecasts (H1) 
The relation between voluntary and mandatory disclosures has long been of interest to 
researchers. Understanding such interaction helps one better assess the overall effect of 
mandatory disclosure regulation; hence this line of research is also of interest to accounting 
regulators. Theoretical work modeling the relation between voluntary and mandatory disclosures 
looks at different disclosure settings and makes different assumptions. For example, Gigler and 
Hemmer (1998) argue that mandatory disclosure serves a confirmatory role, indicating a 
complementary relation between mandatory and voluntary disclosures. In Gigler and Hemmer 
(1998), managers’ private signal cannot be credibly communicated through voluntary disclosure 
alone. Mandatory disclosure such as audited financial statements that occur after voluntary 
disclosure can be used to verify the voluntarily disclosed signal. Ball et al. (2012) provide 
empirical evidence for the prediction in Gigler and Hemmer (1998) by showing that higher levels 
of financial statement verification are associated with more frequent and better quality 
management forecasts.  
Our study is closely related to the theoretical work of Einhorn (2005). In Einhorn (2005), 
both voluntary and mandatory disclosures are credible, and the two signals can be disclosed at 
the same time. She shows that the probability of voluntary disclosure is increasing in the total 
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level of noise in mandatory disclosure.7 In our setting, Einhorn’s (2005) prediction implies that 
managers are likely to issue voluntary ETR forecasts when mandatory ETR forecasts under the 
integral method are noisy as a result of tax complexity. Einhorn (2005) also shows that voluntary 
disclosure is more likely under a strict mandatory disclosure regime where managers’ discretion 
in financial reporting is limited. Mergenthaler (2010) develops a measure that classifies 
accounting standards into rules-based versus principles-based. ASC 740 (SFAS 109 in 
Mergenthaler 2010) meets all four criteria of a rules-based standard. Hence, managers have 
limited discretion in applying ASC 740, and they have incentives to convey tax information via 
voluntary disclosure.8  
Prior literature on voluntary tax disclosure documents that management voluntarily 
discloses tax-related information to improve transparency, especially when the firm engages in 
aggressive tax planning. Schwab (2014) shows that firms with greater tax avoidance are more 
likely to voluntarily disclose book-tax difference (BTD) information in earnings releases. 
Balakrishnan et al. (2018) find that firms engaging in aggressive tax planning include a larger 
number of tax-related words in the Management Discussion & Analysis (MD&A) Section of 10-
Ks and conference calls. Similarly, Ehinger et al. (2017) find that the likelihood of income tax 
mention in conference calls is positively associated with tax aggressiveness.9 
 On the other hand, prior studies also suggest that voluntary disclosure is a decreasing 
function of information uncertainty. When information uncertainty is high, outsiders are less 
certain about management’s information endowment (Dye 1985; Jung and Kwon 1988; Houston 
                                                          
7 Einhorn (2005) shows that the monotonic relation holds as long as the total level of noise in mandatory disclosure 
does not exceed the variance of the underlying value, i.e., the mandatory disclosure needs to at least provide some 
information about the underlying value.  
8 The four criteria for a rules-based standard include: (1) bright-line thresholds; (2) scope and legacy exceptions; (3) 
high levels of implementation guidance; and (4) high levels of detail.  
9 Different from other studies, McGuire (2009) finds that firms are less likely to explain a fourth quarter ETR 
decrease in earnings announcements when it is due to tax planning. 
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et al. 2010), so withholding is less costly. In addition, managers themselves may not always have 
better or more precise information. Chen et al. (2011) show that the lack of predictability is often 
a reason why firms stop providing earnings guidance. In addition, ex post inaccurate guidance 
diminishes future guidance credibility and management reputation (e.g., Graham et al. 2005; 
Feng and Koch 2010). Finally, firms with higher tax complexity might want to withhold tax 
disclosure to avoid regulatory scrutiny. Hence, when tax complexity is high, managers might be 
reluctant to provide forward-looking tax information. Overall, whether the decision to provide 
voluntary ETR forecasts is positively or negatively associated with tax complexity is an open 
question. We state our first hypothesis as follows in null form: 
H1: The likelihood of management providing voluntary ETR forecasts is not associated 
with a firm’s income tax complexity. 
 
2.2 Analysts’ understanding of tax information 
Analysts are often viewed as sophisticated information intermediaries. However, the 
evidence on analysts’ ability to process tax-related information is mixed. Earlier studies find that 
analysts fail to incorporate tax-related accounts (e.g., carryforwards, book-tax differences) or 
regime changes (e.g., the adoption of ASC 740, the Tax Reform Act of 1986) into earnings or 
ETR forecasts (Abarbanell and Bushee 1997; Amir and Sougiannis 1999; Chen and Schoderbek 
2000; Plumlee 2003; Weber 2009).  
Recent studies paint a different picture of analysts as being sophisticated with regard to 
income taxes. Baik et al. (2016) show that the presence of analysts’ pre-tax income forecasts 
attenuates the tax expense anomaly documented in Thomas and Zhang (2011). In a similar vein, 
Mauler (2019) shows that analysts’ tax forecasts help investors see through earnings 
management via the tax account. Chen et al. (2018) suggest that analysts’ influence on firms’ 
tax-planning activities derives from their tax-specific research efforts. Bratten et al. (2017) 
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document that more than 70 percent of analyst ETR forecasts do not mimic management 
mandatory ETR forecasts and analyst ETR forecasts are sometimes more accurate than 
management ETR forecasts. They conclude that “analysts understand complex tax 
environments.” Our study extends this recent line of research by asking where do analysts obtain 
their seemingly superior tax knowledge. In particular, we focus on an under-explored source of 
tax-related information – management voluntary ETR forecasts.  
2.3 The informativeness of management voluntary ETR forecasts (H2 and H3) 
Management voluntary earnings guidance aligns market expectations with managers’ 
private information (Ajinkya and Gift 1984). Prior research shows that earnings guidance is 
positively associated with analyst earnings forecast revisions (Cotter et al. 2006), forecast 
accuracy (Waymire 1986), analyst following (Cotter et al. 2006), and negatively associated with 
analyst forecast dispersion (Bagniski et al. 1993; Clement et al. 2003).  
We focus on management voluntary ETR forecast and its effect on analyst ETR forecasts. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that voluntary ETR forecast is a key input to analysts’ ETR 
forecasts (see footnote 3 for examples). A growing literature documents that management 
disclosure of tax-related information improves analyst forecasting performance. Schwab (2014) 
focuses on management voluntary disclosure of book-tax-difference (BTD) related information 
in earnings releases. He finds that voluntary BTD disclosure alleviates the positive association 
between BTD and analyst earnings forecast errors, suggesting that such disclosure helps analysts 
incorporate BTD into earnings forecasts. In a similar vein, Balakrishnan et al. (2018) show that 
the volume of tax-related information (i.e., the number of tax-related words) in the Management 
Discussion & Analysis (MD&A) section and conference calls marginally attenuates the positive 
relation between aggressive tax planning and analyst earnings forecast errors.  
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More closely related to our study are Koutney (2018) and Ehinger et al. (2017). Koutney 
(2018) examines the determinants and information content of analyst ETR forecasts that disagree 
with management voluntary ETR forecasts. Using a hand-collected sample of management 
voluntary annual ETR forecasts from fourth-quarter conference calls, he first finds that about 
one-third of analysts issue disagreeing ETR forecasts and less experienced analysts are more 
likely to issue disagreeing ETR forecasts. He also finds that disagreeing analyst ETR forecasts 
are less accurate, suggesting that these analyst ETR forecasts do not improve on management 
voluntary ETR forecasts. Ehinger et al. (2017) examine the determinants and consequences of 
tax-related discussions in conference calls and find that analysts’ ETR forecasts are more 
accurate when income tax-related topics are mentioned during the conference calls. Different 
from Ehinger et al. (2017) who rely on the bag-of-words approach, our study, as well as Koutney 
(2018), focus on numeric voluntary ETR forecasts to better quantify the forward-looking tax 
information.10 
Although prior research documents a positive relation between voluntary disclosure and 
analyst forecasting performance, analysts may not find voluntary ETR forecasts informative for 
several reasons. If managers simply reiterate their mandatory ETR forecasts in earnings calls, 
such voluntary ETR forecasts do not add new information because sophisticated analysts should 
be able to figure out mandatory ETR forecast values from financial statements. Also, the fact that 
management earnings guidance is only more accurate than analyst earnings forecasts half of the 
time (Hutton et al. 2012) implies that managers do not always have an information advantage. In 
addition, analysts could gather tax-related information by conducting tax-specific research (e.g., 
Bratten et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2018). Analysts could also seek help from in-house 
                                                          
10 Ehinger et al. (2017) find that 71.2% of their conference calls contain forward-looking tax information, while we 
find that 22.6% of conference calls contain numerical ETR forecasts. Hence, empirically our construct (numeric 
voluntary ETR forecast) is different from that in Ehinger et al. (2017). 
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macroeconomic experts as income tax expense is affected by macroeconomic policies (see 
footnote 4 for an example), while firms might not be equipped with such resources. Overall, 
whether voluntary ETR forecasts are incrementally informative over mandatory ETR forecasts 
remains an open question. Based on our discussion above, we state our second hypothesis in null 
form as follows: 
H2: Management voluntary ETR forecasts are not incrementally informative over their 
mandatory ETR forecasts to analysts. 
 
In addition, managers have more discretion in conveying their private tax information via 
voluntary disclosure, while mandatory ETR forecasts, on the other hand, are subject to the 
integral method rules. When there are discrete items, current quarter year-to-date ETR is no 
longer a good proxy for managers’ true expectation of full-year tax rates (Bratten et al. 2017) and 
managers have stronger incentives to issue voluntary ETR forecasts to convey their true ETR 
expectation. As such, we expect voluntary ETR forecasts to be particularly informative in the 
presence of discrete tax items and state our final hypothesis as follows:  
H3: Management voluntary ETR forecasts are more informative than their mandatory 
ETR forecasts in the presence of discrete tax items. 
 
 
III. VARIABLE MEASUREMENT AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this section, we first describe how we extract and measure management voluntary ETR 
forecasts. We then present our empirical models and describe the measurement of our main 
variables. 
3.1 Management voluntary ETR forecasts 
We collect management voluntary ETR forecasts from quarterly earnings conference call 
transcripts from seekingalpha.com. We focus on managers’ explicit ETR forecasts expressed in 
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the form of tax rates.11 Our focus on tax rate forecasts is consistent with industry practice (see 
footnote 3; McKinsey & Co., Koller, Goedhart, and Wessel 2010) that analysts forecast tax 
expense by applying ETR forecasts to pretax earnings forecasts. We observe that the majority of 
voluntary ETR forecasts are located in the presentation section of conference calls.12 
We identify sentences potentially containing voluntary ETR forecasts using the following 
three criteria: 1) keywords – ETR, effective tax rate, or tax rate; 2) verbs in the future tense, such 
as expect, will be, and project; and 3) numerical values followed by “percent” or “%.” In 
addition to point and range voluntary ETR forecasts, we also collect the types – GAAP, non-
GAAP, cash, and unspecified – as well as the forecasting period – quarterly, annual, or long-term 
– of voluntary ETR forecasts. Appendix A presents the detailed data construction process, data 
fields, and summary statistics prior to merging with other databases. 
3.2 Empirical models 
3.2.1 The decision to issue voluntary ETR forecasts  
We employ the following probit model to investigate factors driving the voluntary ETR 
forecast decision (H1):  
Pr(Guide) = β0 + βkTax Complexity + βmOperation Complexity + βnInformation Environment and 
Disclosure Practice + YearFE + QuarterFE + IndustryFE + ε 
(1) 
 
where Guide is an indicator variable coded one if firm i provides a voluntary annual ETR 
forecast in quarter q’s earnings call and zero otherwise. We focus on the annual forecast horizon 
(forecast period indicator = 1) because the mandatory ETR forecast required under the integral 
                                                          
11 Management may also voluntarily provide implicit ETR forecasts by forecasting pretax income and net income 
(or tax expense).  
12 Voluntary ETR guidance provided in the presentation section is sometimes accompanied by a discussion of 
possible tax law changes (e.g., R&D credit extension) and changes in geographical composition of earnings. The 
discussion of voluntary ETR guidance in the question-and-answer section is relatively brief and often times 
qualitative.  
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method represents a full-year ETR forecast. 77.6% of voluntary ETR forecasts are for annual 
ETR in our sample.  
We include ten variables to capture various dimensions of tax complexity, including the 
difficulty of forecasting ETRs, as well as tax planning and tax law induced uncertainty.13 First, 
following Bratten et al. (2017), we include the absolute value of the change in quarterly ETR 
from quarter q-1 to q (∆ETR),14 quarterly ETR volatility (σETR), and the absolute value of the 
difference between quarterly ETR and the statutory rate (PermDiff) to proxy for tax uncertainty 
and the difficulty of forecasting taxes. In addition, under the integral method, discrete tax items 
are recognized in the quarter they occur, and such items increase the difficulty of forecasting 
ETRs. Donelson et al. (2018) find that IBES actual ETR is a “street” number that often excludes 
discrete items. Hence, the difference between IBES actual ETR and quarterly GAAP ETR can be 
used to identify the existence of discrete items, and we set Discrete equal to one (zero) when the 
absolute value of the difference between the two is greater (less) than 0.5% (Bratten et al. 2017). 
Relatedly, we include net operating loss carry-forward (NOL), retroactive R&D tax credit 
extension (RetroLegislation), and stock compensation (StockComp) as those are common sources 
of discrete items (see Appendix B). 
Finally, firms engaging in tax planning are more likely to voluntarily disclose tax 
information to mitigate transparency issues resulted from tax aggressiveness (Schwab 2014; 
Balakrishnan et al. 2018). Therefore, we include total book-tax-difference (BTD), foreign income 
                                                          
13 We acknowledge that some variables may proxy for both tax complexity and operation complexity, and there is 
some subjectivity in classifying these variables. 
14 ∆ETR is set to zero for the first fiscal quarter. As the integral method applies to interim reporting of tax expense, 
the difference between fourth quarter ETR of the prior year and first quarter ETR of the current year does not 
necessarily proxy for the difficulty of forecasting ETR of the current year. Our inferences remain unchanged if we 
calculate the first fiscal quarter ∆ETR as the absolute value of the difference between ETR in Quarter 1, year t and 
Quarter 4, year t-1.   
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(ForIncome), and the number of subsidiaries in tax haven countries (TaxHaven) to proxy for 
firms’ tax-planning activity.  
In addition, we control for variables that capture various aspects of operation complexity, 
including firm size (Size), market to book (MB), R&D expense (RD), ROA, and leverage 
(Leverage). We also include a loss indicator (Loss) as loss firms are less likely to provide 
voluntary earnings guidance (e.g., Chen et al. 2011). To proxy for firms’ information 
environment, we include analyst coverage (Coverage), institutional ownership (IO), bid-ask 
spreads (Spread), and volatility of monthly stock returns (StdRet). We expect IO and Coverage 
(StdRet and Spread) to be positively (negatively) associated with the issuance of voluntary ETR 
forecasts. Finally, we include two proxies for firms’ disclosure practice that could be associated 
with voluntary ETR forecasts. First, because providing an ETR forecast is a form of 
disaggregated disclosure, we expect the extent of disaggregation in management guidance 
(N_Disagg) to be positively related to the issuance of voluntary ETR forecasts. Second, we 
include whether managers provide voluntary ETR forecasts in the prior quarter (Guideq-1) 
because providing such forecasts can be part of firms’ disclosure practice. 
We cluster standard errors by firm because disclosure practice and firm characteristics 
could be serially correlated. We also include industry, year, and quarter fixed effects in all 
specifications throughout our study. Appendix C provides detailed variable definitions. 
3.2.2 The incremental informativeness of voluntary ETR forecasts  
Providing voluntary ETR forecasts is a firm choice. To alleviate the self-selection 
concern that firms providing forecasts are inherently different from firms that do not forecast, we 
employ the Heckman (1979) two-stage approach (Lennox et al. 2011). We estimate Eq. (1) as the 
first-stage regression and use the number of income statement line items provided in 
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management guidance (N_Disagg) as the exclusion variable. We expect that firms issuing more 
disaggregated guidance are more likely to provide voluntary ETR forecasts. Yet we do not have 
a strong reason to expect that management guidance disaggregation (N_Disagg) directly affects 
analyst ETR forecasts. 
To test H2, we regress analyst ETR forecast revisions on the news contained in voluntary 
and mandatory ETR forecasts and control for the inverse-Mills-ratio (IMR) derived from the first 
stage. Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
A_Rev = a0+ a1V_News + a2M_News + Controls + IMR + Year FE + Industry FE + 
Quarter FE + ε 
(2) 
We compute analyst ETR forecast revision (A_Rev) as the signed difference between 
post-call analyst consensus ETR forecast and pre-call analyst consensus ETR forecast as we are 
interested in both the magnitude and the direction of revision. The pre (post)-call period covers a 
45-day window [-45, -1] ([0, 45]) where day 0 is the conference call date (Figure 1 Panel A). We 
measure news in voluntary ETR forecasts (V_News) as the difference between voluntary ETR 
forecast and pre-call analyst consensus ETR forecast. We calculate news in mandatory ETR 
forecasts (M_News) in a similar fashion. Controls include all independent variables from Eq. (1), 
except for N_Disagg (the exclusion variable). A positive a1 in Eq. (2) is consistent with voluntary 
ETR forecasts being incrementally informative over mandatory ETR forecasts.  
We provide a detailed timeline of voluntary ETR forecasts, analyst ETR forecasts, and 
mandatory ETR forecasts in Figure 1 Panel A. Note that mandatory ETR forecasts (i.e., year-to-
date ETR) become available on the earnings announcement day, the same day of voluntary ETR 
forecasts. To properly examine the incremental information content of voluntary ETR forecasts 
over mandatory ETR forecasts, we utilize voluntary and mandatory ETR forecasts released in the 
first, second, and third fiscal quarter earnings announcements (shaded area in Figure 1 Panel B) 
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when estimating Eq. (2) as the year-to-date ETR released in the fourth quarter earnings 
announcement is the actual realized annual ETR, not annual ETR forecast under the integral 
method.   
[Insert Figure 1] 
IV. SAMPLE AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Sample construction 
We construct our voluntary ETR forecast sample using earnings call transcripts from 
2006 to 2016 (123,908 transcripts) as seekingalpha.com coverage of earnings calls before 2006 
is sparse. 16,127 firm-quarters provide numeric ETR forecasts (more details in Appendix A), and 
77.6% of these ETR forecasts are on an annual basis. Our voluntary ETR forecast sample is 
generally evenly distributed throughout the fiscal year with slightly more observations in the last 
two fiscal quarters (Table A1 Panel B). On average, firms issuing voluntary ETR forecasts in the 
prior quarter or the same quarter last year are likely to issue voluntary ETR forecasts in the 
current quarter, suggesting that firms issue voluntary ETR forecasts consistently (untabulated).  
For our determinant analysis, we start with the Compustat Fundamentals Quarterly file 
and retain U.S. firms and firm-quarters with conference call transcripts (77,181 observations 
remain). We then remove observations with missing control variables in Eq. (1) (44,383 
observations remain). Among the 44,383 observations, 10,027 provide voluntary annual ETR 
forecasts. Among the 10,027 observations, 22.1% (2,212) of observations are explicit non-GAAP 
ETR forecasts, 9.5% (950) of observations are explicit GAAP ETR forecasts, and 71.5% (7,170) 
of observations are unspecified ETR forecasts (Table 1).  
To examine the relation between management voluntary ETR forecasts and analyst ETR 
forecasts, we start with the 10,027 firm-quarters with non-missing voluntary annual ETR 
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forecasts and available analyst ETR forecasts. In addition, because we are interested in the 
interaction between voluntary and mandatory ETR forecasts, the year-to-date ETR released in 
the fourth quarter earnings announcements are dropped from our sample as discussed in Section 
3.2.2. Sample construction details are presented in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1] 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 Panel A presents summary statistics for variables used in the determinant model. 
22.6% firm-quarters provide either point or range annual ETR forecasts, and 5% provide non-
GAAP annual ETR forecasts.15 The mean volatility of quarterly GAAP ETR over the prior 12 
quarters (σETR) is 0.082. The mean absolute value of quarter-to-quarter change in ETR (∆ETR) 
is 0.051. The presence of discrete items and net operating loss is prevalent as the mean values of 
Discrete and NOL are 46.8% and 48.5%, respectively. On average, firms in our sample have at 
least one tax haven subsidiary (TaxHaven). 
Turning to other firm characteristics, the mean debt-to-asset ratio (Leverage) is 24.1%. 
An average firm is followed by 10.7 analysts, and 39.2% of its shares are owned by institutions. 
The mean N_Disagg is 0.44 unconditionally. Conditional on management providing guidance for 
at least one income statement item, the mean N_Disagg is 2.5 (untabulated), suggesting that on 
average firms provide guidance on 2.5 income statement items. 
The descriptive statistics of variables in the revision and accuracy tests are reported in 
Panel B. The first eight variables are reported for informational purpose and are not used in 
subsequent regressions. On average, voluntary ETR forecasts (31.3%) are higher than mandatory 
                                                          
15 In our sample, firms provide voluntary ETR forecasts 22.6% of the time. Chapman and Green (2018) examine 
whether analysts’ requests for forward-looking information (e.g., CAPEX, cash flow, EBITDA, EPS, operating 
margin, and tax rate) during conference calls influence management decision to voluntarily provide similar guidance 
in future quarters. Using textual analysis, they find that firms in their sample provide tax rate guidance 19% of the 
time on average (their Table 2 Panel A).   
21 
 
ETR forecasts (30.4%) (p-value < .001). The correlation between mandatory and voluntary ETR 
forecasts is 0.64, and for 70% of the sample, the two forecasts differ by more than 0.5% 
(untabulated).16 In general, mandatory ETR forecasts are lower than pre-call analyst consensus 
ETR forecasts (the mean of M_News=-0.008), and voluntary ETR forecasts are slightly higher 
than pre-call analyst consensus ETR forecasts (p-value = 0.08). With regard to accuracy, 
voluntary ETR forecasts (V_Acc) are significantly more accurate than mandatory ETR forecasts 
(M_Acc) (p-value < .0001). Overall, the above univariate findings suggest that information 
embedded in voluntary and mandatory ETR forecasts is different and voluntary ETR forecasts 
are relatively more accurate.  
 [Insert Table 2] 
4.3 The determinants of issuing voluntary ETR forecasts (H1) 
We report Eq. (1) estimates in Table 3. In Column 1, we include all firm-quarters (with or 
without voluntary ETR forecasts) in the regression. In Column 2, we retain observations with 
voluntary ETR forecasts and investigate the factors driving the decision to provide non-GAAP 
ETR forecasts. Focusing on Column 1, we observe that managers are more likely to provide 
voluntary ETR forecasts when quarter-to-quarter ETR changes are large (∆ETR), when discrete 
items occur in the quarter (Discrete), when there are net operating loss carryforwards (NOL), and 
when the firm has more extensive foreign operations (ForIncome and TaxHaven). An F-test 
suggests that the tax complexity variables as a group are jointly different from zero (p-value < 
.0001), indicating a positive association between tax complexity and the issuance of voluntary 
ETR forecasts.  
                                                          
16 Our main inferences remain unchanged if we restrict our test sample to firm-quarters for which voluntary and 
mandatory ETR forecasts differ by greater than 0.5%. 
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With regard to the relation between operation complexity and the decision to provide 
voluntary ETR forecasts, firms with higher market-to-book ratio are more likely to forecast, 
consistent with growth firms having more incentives to provide voluntary disclosure to mitigate 
information asymmetry (Core 2001). Larger firms are less likely to issue voluntary ETR 
forecasts. We fail to find a significant relation between other operational complexity variables 
and voluntary ETR forecasts.  
Finally, turning to proxies that capture firms’ information environment and disclosure 
practice, we find a weak positive relation between analyst coverage (Coverage) and voluntary 
ETR forecasts. We also find that firms with more volatile stock returns (StdRet) and higher bid-
ask spread (Spread) are less likely to issue voluntary ETR forecasts. The coefficient on Guideq-1 
is significantly positive, indicating that voluntary ETR forecasts are persistent as firms providing 
forecasts in prior quarters are also more likely to do so in future quarters. Finally, we find that 
the level of guidance disaggregation (N_Disagg) is positively associated with the issuance of 
ETR forecasts. An F-test suggests that the information environment and disclosure practice 
variables as a group are jointly different from zero (p-value < .0001), indicating a positive 
association between firms’ information environment and disclosure practice and the issuance of 
voluntary ETR forecasts. 
We further investigate factors associated with the type of voluntary ETR forecasts 
conditional on management issuing a voluntary ETR forecast. We replace Guide in Eq. (1) with 
NonGAAP_Guide, an indicator variable coded one if firm i provides a voluntary non-GAAP ETR 
forecast in quarter q earnings call and zero otherwise. Column 2 shows that managers are more 
likely to provide voluntary non-GAAP ETR forecasts when quarterly ETRs are more volatile 
(σETR), in the presence of discrete items (Discrete), and when there is a large difference between 
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GAAP ETR and statutory tax rate (PermDiff). An F-test suggests that the tax complexity 
variables as a group are jointly different from zero (p-value < .0001), indicating that tax 
complexity is positively related to the decision to provide voluntary non-GAAP ETR forecasts. 
Taken together, Table 3 suggests that firms with higher tax complexity are more likely to provide 
voluntary ETR forecasts, and conditional on issuing ETR forecasts, these firms are more likely to 
issue non-GAAP ETR forecasts. We also find that firms’ information environment and 
disclosure practice are significantly associated with the voluntary ETR forecast decision. 
[Insert Table 3] 
4.4 The incremental informativeness of voluntary ETR forecasts  
In Section 4.4.1, we investigate whether voluntary ETR forecasts provide incremental 
information over mandatory ETR forecasts (H2). We report the tests for H3 in Section 4.4.2. The 
results of additional analyses are presented in Section 4.4.3.  
4.4.1 Voluntary ETR forecasts and analyst ETR forecast revisions (H2) 
To examine the incremental informativeness of voluntary ETR forecasts, we estimate Eq. 
(2), controlling for the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the determinant model (i.e., the first-
stage regression). As described in Section 3.2.2, we employ management guidance 
disaggregation (N_Disagg) as the exclusion variable.  
Table 4 presents the results of Eq. (2). In Column 1, where we include all types of 
voluntary ETR forecasts, the coefficients on both voluntary ETR forecast news (V_News) and 
mandatory ETR forecast news (M_News) are positive and significant (p-values of .000 and .021), 
suggesting that analysts incorporate the information/news in both voluntary and mandatory ETR 
forecasts into their ETR forecast revisions. In terms of economic significance, a one standard 
deviation increase in V_News (M_News) is associated with analyst ETR forecast revision of 1% 
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(0.4%).17 In addition, an F-test indicates that the coefficient on V_News is significantly greater 
than the coefficient on M_News (p-value = 0.001), suggesting that analysts place a greater weight 
on voluntary ETR forecasts when forming ETR forecasts. The coefficient on the inverse Mills 
ratio (IMR) is insignificant, suggesting that self-selection is unlikely to be a significant concern.  
Voluntary disclosure also offers managers the discretion to convey their private 
information using either GAAP or non-GAAP based metrics. In Columns 2-4, we separately 
assess the informativeness of non-GAAP, GAAP, and unspecified ETR forecasts. The non-
GAAP literature shows that managers are more likely to report non-GAAP earnings when GAAP 
earnings are less informative and more volatile (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Lougee and 
Marquardt 2004; Curtis et al. 2014). When the voluntary ETR forecast is non-GAAP based, we 
anticipate it to add incremental information over GAAP-based mandatory ETR forecasts. For 
example, the mandatory ETR forecast may include one-time items (such as tax settlements) that 
will not persist, and managers can use their discretion to communicate “core” ETRs via non-
GAAP voluntary ETR disclosure. In Column 2, we find that the coefficient on V_News is 
significant and statistically larger than the coefficient on M_News, which is insignificant.  
With regard to voluntary GAAP ETR forecasts, in our setting, mandatory ETR forecast is 
already a GAAP-based metric. On the surface, one might expect that voluntary GAAP ETR 
forecasts are not incrementally informative to analysts as it shares largely the same underlying 
tax-information set as mandatory ETR forecasts. Yet there is nuance between mandatory ETR 
forecasts and voluntary GAAP ETR forecasts. Mandatory ETR forecasts – reflected in year-to-
date ETRs – can be affected by discrete items from past quarters while voluntary GAAP ETR 
                                                          
17 For example, the 1% increase is calculated as the coefficient on V_News (0.185) multiplied by the standard 
deviation of V_News (0.056) from Table 2.   
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forecasts could be more forward-looking.18 As such, voluntary GAAP ETR forecasts could still 
be informative to outsiders, and this is indeed what we find in Column 3. In addition, we find 
that the coefficients on V_News and M_News do not differ significantly (p-value = 0.8019), 
suggesting that analysts assign a similar weight on voluntary GAAP ETR forecasts and 
mandatory ETR forecasts.  
Finally, in Column 4, when managers do not specify the type of voluntary ETR forecasts, 
there is some suggestive evidence that analysts place a higher weight on voluntary ETR forecasts 
(one-tailed p-value = 0.083). Overall, the results in Table 4 are consistent with H1 that voluntary 
ETR forecasts have incremental information content over mandatory ETR forecasts.  
 [Insert Table 4] 
4.4.2 Voluntary ETR forecasts and analyst ETR forecast revisions: the role of discrete items (H3) 
In H3 we hypothesize that voluntary ETR forecasts become a particularly important 
information source for outsiders (analysts) in the presence of discrete tax items. As such, we 
partition our sample into firm-quarters with and without discrete tax items and repeat the 
analyses in Eq. (2).  
 We report the results in Table 5. In Panel A, we find that, when there are discrete tax 
items, the coefficients on V_News remain significantly positive in Columns 1-4. Also, the 
coefficients on V_News are statistically larger than the coefficient on M_News in all columns 
except for Column 3, where the voluntary ETR forecast is GAAP-based. Note that the 
coefficients on M_News are either insignificant or only marginally significant. Overall, the 
                                                          
18 For example, at the beginning of the year, firm A expects the full-year GAAP ETR to be 30% ($100 pretax 
income and $30 tax expense in each quarter). In Q1, it reports $100 pretax income as expected, and recognizes a $20 
discrete tax item. Because discrete tax items must be recorded fully in the quarter they occur, the year-to-date GAAP 
ETR for Q1 will be 50% ((30+20)/100), while the “correct” full-year ETR should be (30*4+20)/400 = 35%. In this 
case, the mandatory ETR forecast embedded in year-to-date ETR (50%) does not truly reflect managers’ expectation 
of full-year ETR (which is now 35%) and managers can voluntarily disclose their full-year GAAP ETR forecast, 
35%, in earnings calls. 
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results suggest that in the presence of discrete items analysts place a greater weight on voluntary 
ETR forecasts compared to mandatory ETR forecasts. Our results can be interpreted together 
with that in Bratten et al. (2017), who focus on mandatory ETR forecasts and show that in the 
presence of discrete items analysts are less likely to rely on mandatory ETR forecasts. Here we 
show that when mandatory ETR forecasts are less informative due to discrete tax items, 
managers convey useful information via voluntary ETR disclosure and analysts do rely on such 
information when forming their ETR forecasts. 
 Next, in Panel B, in the absence of discrete tax items, the coefficient on V_News is 
positive and significant only in Columns 1 and 4. On the other hand, the coefficients on M_News 
are significantly positive in three out of four columns. More importantly, the coefficients on 
V_News are no longer statistically larger than the coefficients on M_News in all four columns, 
suggesting that mandatory ETR forecast, free of discrete items, is at least as informative as 
voluntary ETR forecasts. Overall, we conclude that voluntary ETR forecasts provide incremental 
information for financial analysts, particularly in the presence of discrete tax items, consistent 
with H3.  
[Insert Table 5] 
4.4.3 Additional Analyses 
4.4.3.1 Subsample analyses  
Bratten et al. (2017) document that when analysts do not “mimic” managers’ mandatory 
ETR forecasts (i.e., the difference between analyst ETR forecast and mandatory ETR forecast is 
greater than 0.5%), their ETR forecasts are sometimes more accurate. This result suggests that 
the non-mimicking analysts have the sophistication to process tax-related information. Non-
mimicking analysts may derive superior ETR forecasts from tax-specific research efforts (Chen 
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et al. 2018). Alternatively, when non-mimicking analysts do not follow mandatory ETR forecasts, 
they may still rely on management voluntary tax rate disclosure, an important information 
channel previously under-explored. Hence, we also examine whether these non-mimicking 
analysts incorporate management voluntary ETR forecasts into their ETR expectations.  
In Table 6 we re-estimate Eq. (2) in the subsample of non-mimicking analysts.19 We 
classify firm-quarters into Mimic = 0 if the post-call consensus analyst annual ETR forecast 
differs from the mandatory ETR forecast by more than 0.5%.20 In our sample, we have 76% 
firm-quarters with Mimic = 0, consistent with the 74% reported in Bratten et al. (2017). We find 
that when analysts do not mimic management mandatory ETR forecasts, the coefficients on 
V_News are positive and significant across all types of voluntary ETR forecasts. Also, the 
coefficient on V_News is statistically larger than the coefficients on M_News in the overall 
sample (Column 1) and particularly when the voluntary ETR forecast is non-GAAP based 
(Column 2). This result suggests that analysts derive their ETR forecasts from voluntary ETR 
forecasts, even though they might ignore mandatory ETR forecasts. Hence, our analysis of both 
voluntary and mandatory ETR forecasts paints a more complete picture of how tax information is 
communicated between managers and outsiders.  
[Insert Table 6] 
4.4.3.2 Voluntary ETR forecast accuracy and analyst ETR forecast accuracy  
So far, we document that analysts respond to the news contained in management 
voluntary ETR forecasts. Prior literature shows that voluntary earnings guidance can be strategic 
                                                          
19 In the subsample of mimicking analysts (Mimic = 1), mandatory ETR forecast news explain almost all variation in 
analyst forecast revisions (evidenced by the close to 100% R-squared and close to one coefficient on M_News) so 
we do not present the results. 
20 Bratten et al. (2017) classify firm-quarters into Mimic = 0 when individual analyst’s implied quarterly ETR 
forecast is different from mandatory ETR forecast by more than 0.5%. Because our analysis is at the firm-quarter 
level, modified from Bratten et al. (2017), we classify firm-quarters into Mimic = 0 if the post-call consensus analyst 
annual ETR forecast differs from mandatory ETR forecast more than 0.5%. 
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(i.e., walk-down of analyst earnings forecasts) and serve managers’ self-interest (e.g., Cotter et 
al. 2006). Hence, it is possible that managers provide optimistically biased ETR forecasts to 
lower analyst after-tax earnings expectations.21 In this section, we examine whether voluntary 
ETR forecasts improve analyst ETR forecast accuracy to shed further light on the “inform” 
versus “mislead” role of voluntary ETR forecasts.  
Empirically, we investigate whether post-call analyst ETR forecast accuracy is positively 
related to voluntary ETR forecast accuracy, controlling for mandatory ETR forecast accuracy. 
We replace A_Rev, V_News, and M_News in Eq. (2) with post-call analyst ETR forecast 
accuracy (A_Acc), voluntary ETR forecast accuracy (V_Acc) and mandatory ETR forecast 
accuracy (M_Acc), respectively, and control for pre-call analyst ETR accuracy (A_Accpre-call). 
A_Acc is the absolute value of the difference between I/B/E/S actual ETR and post-call mean 
analyst ETR forecast, multiplied by -1.22 V_Acc,  M_Acc, and A_Accpre-call are defined similarly. 
Higher values represent more accurate ETR forecasts. 
 Consistent with results in Table 4, Table 7 shows that voluntary ETR forecast accuracy is 
positively and significantly associated with post-call analyst ETR forecast accuracy after 
controlling for mandatory ETR forecast accuracy and pre-call analyst ETR forecast accuracy 
across in all columns. The coefficients on M_Acc are also positive and significant in three out of 
four columns. In Column 1, the coefficient on V_Acc is not statistically different from the 
coefficient on M_Acc, suggesting that both voluntary and mandatory ETR forecasts are equally 
                                                          
21 Univariately, we find that 54% of voluntary ETR forecasts are lower than pre-call consensus analyst ETR 
forecasts (untabulated). 
22 Following Bratten et al. (2017), we use the implicit actual ETR from I/B/E/S as the benchmark to calculate analyst 
ETR forecast accuracy because analysts commonly exclude special items from their forecasts and I/B/E/S actual 
numbers are also adjusted for these exclusion items such that IBES actual and analyst forecasts are on a comparable 
basis. We also use Compustat annual GAAP ETR (total tax expense divided by pre-tax income) as another 
benchmark since GAAP-based (Compustat) and “street”-based (IBES) benchmarks (e.g. earnings) may produce 
different interpretation of results (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002). The results (untabulated) are very similar with the 
ones using IBES actual ETR as the benchmark. 
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useful in enhancing analyst ETR forecast accuracy. There is some suggestive evidence that 
voluntary non-GAAP (based on one-tailed p-value) and GAAP ETR forecasts are more useful in 
enhancing analyst ETR forecast accuracy, compared to mandatory ETR forecasts. Collectively, 
the evidence in Table 4 suggests that analysts find voluntary ETR forecast informative and 
respond to it accordingly. Table 7 further shows that voluntary ETR forecasts indeed enhance 
analyst ETR forecast accuracy, so managers issue voluntary ETR forecasts mainly to inform 
outsiders. 
[Insert Table 7] 
4.4.3.3 Controlling for management earnings guidance and analyst earnings forecasts  
 The effect of management earnings guidance on analyst earnings forecasts is well 
established in the literature as voluntary disclosure aligns market expectation with managers’ 
(e.g., Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Waymire 1986; Baginski et al. 1993; Clement et al. 2003; Cotter et 
al. 2006). As such, our main finding is potentially consistent with the following alternative 
explanation. The news contained in management earnings guidance subsume the news contained 
in voluntary ETR forecasts. Hence, it is not the voluntary ETR forecast per se that is informative 
to analysts. Rather, management earnings guidance induces both analyst earnings forecast 
revision and ETR forecast revision. To this end, we additionally control for news contained in 
management earnings guidance (V_EPS_News) and analyst earnings forecast revision 
(A_EPS_Rev) in Eq. (2). 
We present the results in Table 8. The news contained in management earnings guidance 
is generally not related to analyst ETR forecast revisions. The coefficients on analyst earnings 
forecast revision are negative and significant in three out of four columns, consistent with tax 
rate being an input in analyst earnings forecasts. More importantly, the positive relation between 
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news contained in voluntary ETR forecasts and analyst ETR forecast revisions continues to hold. 
Thus, our results suggest that voluntary ETR forecasts convey unique forward-looking tax 
information to the market that is not subsumed by management earnings guidance. 
[Insert Table 8] 
4.4.3.4 The effects of voluntary ETR forecast timing and frequency 
 In the final set of analyses, we exploit the heterogeneity of firms’ disclosure practice to 
examine whether such heterogeneity affects the positive relation between voluntary ETR 
forecasts and analyst ETR forecasts. We first consider the timing of voluntary ETR forecasts. 
Table A1, Panel B suggests that our voluntary ETR forecast sample is generally evenly 
distributed throughout the year with some concentration in the third and fourth quarters. A 
possible explanation is that certain discrete items are more likely to occur toward the end of the 
year. For example, 90% of firms file calendar year tax returns and the majority of those firms 
receive a six-month filing extension, so the provision-to-return adjustment (the difference 
between the estimated book tax provisions and tax amounts on income tax returns) usually 
occurs in the third fiscal quarter (Internal Revenue Service 2013; Example 1 in Appendix B). 
Because discrete items add difficulty to forecasting ETR, we expect voluntary ETR forecasts 
issued in the third fiscal quarter earnings announcements to be more informative for analysts.23 
On the other hand, analysts may rely on management more to form their annual ETR forecasts in 
the early quarters because of the longer forecast horizon and lack of information (e.g., Bradshaw 
et al. 2016).  
In Table 9 Panel A, we estimate Eq. (2) separately for each fiscal quarter. We observe 
that the coefficients on V_News are positive and significant in all three columns, suggesting that 
                                                          
23 As illustrated in Figure 1 Panel B and explained in Section 3.2.2, voluntary ETR forecasts from the fourth quarter 
earnings announcements are not used when we estimate Eq. (2). 
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analysts incorporate the news contained in voluntary ETR forecasts in all three quarters. On the 
other hand, the coefficient on M_News is significant only in the second quarter. In addition, 
analysts place a greater weight on voluntary ETR forecasts compared to mandatory ETR forecast 
in the first quarter (p-value = 0.0003). Collectively, Panel A provides some suggestive evidence 
that voluntary ETR forecasts are more informative when issued earlier in the year. 
We also explore the effect of forecast frequency on analysts’ incorporation of voluntary 
ETR forecasts. In Panel B, we classify firm-quarters as frequent (sporadic) issuers when 
managers provide voluntary ETR forecasts more than (less than or equal to) twice in the prior 
four quarters. 40% of observations issue voluntary ETR forecasts frequently. We then separately 
estimate Eq. (2) for frequent versus sporadic issuers. We observe that, for both groups, the 
coefficients on V_News are significantly greater than the coefficients on M_News, suggesting 
that analysts place a greater weight on voluntary ETR forecasts when updating their ETR 
forecasts. In addition, mandatory ETR forecasts are informative to analysts only in the 
subsample of sporadic issuers. For frequent issuers, analysts seem to ignore mandatory ETR 
forecasts and only rely on voluntary ETR forecasts. Overall, these results imply that analysts 
weigh the information in voluntary disclosure more heavily than the information in mandatory 
disclosure when firms commit to providing voluntary ETR disclosure. 
[Insert Table 9] 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we exploit a unique setting under which we observe both mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures of the same metric – ETR forecasts – to study the interaction between 
forward-looking mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Under the integral method, managers 
have limited discretion in communicating their private tax information via mandatory ETR 
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forecasts, especially when the company’s tax situation is more complex (e.g., foreign operations, 
discrete tax items). We find that firms are more likely to disclose voluntary ETR forecasts when 
tax complexity is higher, consistent with the prediction in Einhorn (2005) that managers provide 
voluntary disclosure when mandatory disclosure is noisy and allows less discretion. Conditional 
on providing ETR forecasts, we further find that firms with higher tax complexity are more 
likely to issue non-GAAP ETR forecasts.  
More importantly, we find that analysts place a greater weight on voluntary ETR 
forecasts when updating their ETR forecasts, suggesting that voluntary ETR forecasts are 
incrementally informative over mandatory ETR forecasts. In addition, we find that all types – 
GAAP, non-GAAP and unspecified – of ETR forecasts are informative to analysts. Cross-
sectionally, we find that voluntary ETR forecast becomes a particularly important information 
source for analysts in the presence of discrete tax items, when issued early in the year, and when 
issued frequently. Our findings are robust in subsamples where analysts do not mimic 
management mandatory ETR forecasts and where voluntary and mandatory ETR forecasts differ 
by a meaningful amount. Results based on analyst ETR forecast accuracy show that voluntary 
ETR forecasts help analysts form better ETR forecasts, suggesting that managers issue voluntary 
ETR forecasts mainly to inform outsiders. Taken together, we provide strong evidence that 
voluntary ETR forecasts, which convey managers’ private tax-related information, are 
incrementally useful over mandatory ETR forecasts for analysts. 
Our study should be of interest to researchers and regulators. First, we enhance the 
understanding of channels through which financial analysts obtain tax-related information as we 
show that management voluntary ETR forecast is an important information source for analysts to 
form ETR forecasts. Second, we add to the literature on the interaction between voluntary and 
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mandatory disclosure by providing new insights that managers use discretion to communicate 
their private information via voluntary disclosure when mandatory disclosure does not allow 
such discretion. Hence, our study employs a unique setting to provide empirical evidence for the 
predictions in Einhorn (2005). Third, we add to the literature on non-GAAP reporting by offering 
new insights on the use of GAAP versus non-GAAP metrics in forward-looking voluntary 
disclosures. The results are also valuable in informing regulators. For example, Regulation G 
requires a reconciliation between forward-looking GAAP and non-GAAP measures to the extent 
possible. However, there is limited empirical evidence on the informativeness of and managerial 
incentives behind forward-looking non-GAAP measures. Our analysis takes a preliminary step in 
understanding these issues. Finally, our finding of an increased likelihood of voluntary tax rate 
disclosure when the GAAP-based mandatory disclosure contains more noise is relevant for the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) when designing and implementing mandatory 
financial accounting standards.  
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Appendix A: Management Voluntary ETR Forecast Sample Construction 
 
We obtain earnings conference call transcripts from seekingalpha.com. The sample 
covers April 24, 2004 to November 28, 2016 (123,908 transcripts). We describe the data 
cleaning process and present the summary statistics of the voluntary ETR forecast sample 
(before merging with other databases) in this section.  
 
A.1. Extraction of Voluntary ETR Forecasts 
Step 1. We begin with extracting sentences with “tax rate(s),” “effective tax rate(s),” or 
“ETR” (We use “tax rate” hereafter). Sentences with tax rates include mentions of GAAP, cash, 
non-GAAP, and unspecified tax rates.  
 
Step 2. We then retain the sentences that forecast future tax rates rather than describe 
current or past tax rates. Identifying future tense verbs is crucial. We iterate three times in this 
step to make sure that we do not miss important verbs and patterns. We list the key verbs and 
patterns used as follows: 
a) expect|expects|expecting| is (now) expected to| 
b) project|projects|projecting|is (now) projected to|are (now|currently|presently) projecting 
c) forecasting|forecast|forecasts|is (now) forecast to|are also forecasting|are 
(now|currently|presently) forecasting| 
d) target|targets|targeting| 
e) estimate|estimates|estimating|is estimated to|is now estimated to| 
f) anticipate|anticipates|anticipating|is anticipated to| 
g) plan|plans|planning|is (now) planned to|are still planning|are planning 
h) assume|assumes|assuming|is assumed to| 
i) remain|remains|remaining| 
j) guide|guides|guiding|guidance 
k) outlook|outlooks 
l) continues to be|should be|is|will be|are|  
 
Overall, we identify four sentence patterns that contain voluntary ETR forecasts as 
follows:  
1. …guidance... future tense verbs...ETR... number (% or percent). Example: “This EPS 
guidance assumes taxes of $49 million to $51 million based on an estimated quarterly non-
GAAP tax rate of roughly 33%.” (Akamai Technologies Q2 2015 Earnings Call) 
2. …ETR…is|will be|remains... number (% or percent). Example: “We continue to expect 
our full year tax rate will be between 26% and 27% reflecting the continued benefits of our 
improvement in business operations...” (Eastman Chemical Co. Q2 2015 Earnings Call) 
3. …future tense verbs... ETR…. number (% or percent). Example: “We expect a full-
year as reported tax rate to be in the range of 34% to 34.5%.” (Stericycle, Inc. Q2 2015 
Earnings Call) 
4. …future tense verbs… number (% or percent)… ETR. Example: “We continue to 
anticipate improvements in the tax rates throughout 2009 and are now forecasting a 22% tax 
rate for the year.” (Celgene Corporation Q1 2009 Earnings Call) 
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Step 3. After identifying future tense ETR mentions, we extract the numerical 
percentages that appear in the same sentence of the ETR mention. We are able to extract 17,791 
observations.  
 
Step 4. We last extract the periodicity (annual or quarterly) and the type of ETR forecasts 
(GAAP, cash, non-GAAP, or unspecified) from the sentences. We also ask research assistants to 
manually check the final 17,791 observations to ensure that all data fields are extracted 
correctly.24 
 
Step 5. After manually checking the 17,791 observations, we delete (1) observations for 
which we cannot link to a specific fiscal year/quarter in Compustat; (2) observations where the 
tax rate mention is not forward-looking. We have a sample of 16,127 firm-quarter observations 
containing 19,950 ETR forecasts. We have more ETR forecasts than firm-quarter observations 
because firms sometimes provide ETR forecasts for multiple fiscal periods (e.g., annual and 
quarterly), as well as forecasts of various types (e.g., both GAAP and cash tax rates).  
 
A.2. Data Fields 
1. Compustat gvkey 
2. Compustat fiscal period end (datadate) 
3. value_1: Either a point ETR forecast or the lower end of a range ETR forecast 
4. value_2: The upper end of a range ETR forecast 
5. Forecasting period (FPI): 
FPI = 1 if an annual ETR forecast for the current year. 
FPI = 2 if an annual ETR forecast for the next year.  
FPI = 6 if a quarterly ETR forecast for the current quarter.  
FPI = 7 if a quarterly ETR forecast for the next quarter.  
FPI = 0 if a long-term ETR forecast. 
6. Type 
Type = 1 for “GAAP ETR,” “book ETR,” “as reported ETR,” “ETR including 
depreciation, special items or discrete items,” or “ETR after…” 
Example: “…the GAAP tax rate is expected to be approximately 23.5%...” 
(Becton, Dickinson and Company Q3 2012 Earnings Call) 
Type = 2 for “non-GAAP ETR,” “adjusted ETR,” “normalized ETR,” “operating ETR,” 
“ETR excluding depreciation, special items or discrete items,” “pro forma ETR,” 
“core ETR,” or “ETR before…” 
Example: “Our estimated income tax rate is 26%, excluding discrete events.” 
(Martin Marietta Materials Q3 2013 Earnings Call) 
Type = 3 for “cash ETR” 
Example: “….we’re guiding towards a cash tax rate of 15.6% in Q4.” 
(priceline.com Incorporated Q3 2012 Earnings Call) 
Type = 4 for unspecified ETR 
                                                          
24 We have four research assistants independently verify all the numerical values and the type of ETR guidance. 
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Example: “We expect the effective tax rate to be approximately 28.3%. This 
reflects our recently approved tax-related benefit of $55 million, including 
interest or $0.15 per diluted share, related to multiple prior years’ tax filings. 
This will be booked in the third quarter. As a result, we've increased our full year 
GAAP, EPS outlook announcing the range of $4.82 to $4.97 per share.” 
(Raytheon Q2 2011 Earnings Call) 
7. Open/qual 
Indicator variable coded one if the ETR forecast is open range or qualitative, and zero 
otherwise.  
  
40 
 
A.3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table A1 presents summary statistics for the management voluntary ETR forecast sample 
before merging with Compustat and I/B/E/S. Panel A reports the number of firm-quarters with 
ETR forecasts by fiscal year. The SeekingAlpha coverage was incomplete before 2006 – we 
have only 81 observations with voluntary ETR forecasts in fiscal 2005. Because our sample 
stops in 2016 – the fiscal 2017 coverage is also incomplete. In our voluntary ETR forecast 
determinant model and subsequent analyses, we discard fiscal years before 2006 and after 2016.  
 
Table A1 Panel B presents the frequency of management ETR forecasts by fiscal quarter. 
We observe slightly more observations in the third and fourth quarters. We provide two possible 
explanations. First, towards the end of the fiscal year, tax-related uncertainty is resolved and 
management is more willing to publicly disclose their ETR estimate. Second, certain discrete tax 
items (e.g., provision-to-return adjustment) occur more frequently in the last two quarters, 
“polluting” the mandatory ETR forecast embedded in year-to-date ETRs. Hence managers have 
incentives to voluntarily provide a cleaner ETR estimate. 
 
In Table A1 Panel C, we tabulate the frequency of different types of management ETR 
forecasts. Because our algorithm requires a numeric value to appear near the word “tax rate,” by 
construction we do not extract qualitative ETR forecasts. The 429 open-range/qualitative ETR 
forecasts that appear in our sample typically look like: we expect our full-year tax rate to be in 
the upper 30%. We have 6,558 range and 12,963 point-estimate ETR forecast observations.  
 
We also code whether the ETR forecast is for GAAP ETR, cash ETR, non-GAAP ETR, 
or unspecified. Non-GAAP ETR is the tax rate adjusted for discrete/special items. During the 
data collection, we note that management often times does not explicitly specify the type of tax 
rate forecasted. Hence, we have 12,904 unspecified ETR forecasts. These ETR forecasts could 
be on a GAAP or non-GAAP basis. We also have 4,500 (explicitly stated) non-GAAP ETR 
forecasts, 2,008 (explicitly stated) GAAP ETR forecasts, and 538 cash ETR forecasts. We 
exclude cash ETR forecasts from our main analysis. 
 
Finally, in Table A1 Panel D, we present summary statistics for the management 
voluntary ETR forecast sample prior to merging with Compustat and IBES. We exclude all 
open-range/qualitative forecasts (19,521 left). The minimum value of voluntary ETR forecasts is 
negative, due to management forecasting a tax benefit. In Panel D we also report summary 
statistics by ETR forecast type. The mean (median) value of cash ETR forecasts is much smaller 
than the other three types, consistent with the empirical observation that cash ETR is on average 
lower than GAAP ETR. In addition, we see that non-GAAP ETR forecasts also have smaller 
mean and median values compared to unspecified and GAAP ETR forecasts.  
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Table A1 Descriptive Statistics of the Voluntary ETR Forecast Sample 
 
Panel A: Number of firm-quarters with voluntary ETR forecasts by fiscal year 
Fiscal Year N 
2005 81 
2006 265 
2007 891 
2008 1,583 
2009 1,176 
2010 1,006 
2011 1,159 
2012 1,619 
2013 2,342 
2014 2,222 
2015 2,240 
2016 1,513 
2017 30 
Total 16,127 
 
Panel B: Number of firm-quarters with voluntary ETR forecasts by fiscal quarter 
Fiscal Quarter N 
1 3,602 
2 3,892 
3 4,055 
4 4,578 
Total 16,127 
 
Panel C: Frequency of different types of voluntary ETR forecasts  
 N  N 
Open range or qualitative 429 Unspecified 12,904 
Range forecasts 6,558 GAAP 2,008 
Point forecasts 12,963 Non-GAAP 4,500 
  Cash 538 
Total 19,950 Total 19,950 
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Table A1 (cont’d) 
Panel D: Summary statistics for point and range voluntary ETR forecasts  
Fiscal 
Year N Mean Std Dev Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
2005 93  0.30 0.10 0.02 0.25 0.32 0.38 0.51 
2006 338  0.30 0.11 -0.20 0.24 0.31 0.37 0.70 
2007 1,085  0.31 0.09 -0.17 0.27 0.33 0.38 0.70 
2008 1,935  0.32 0.09 -0.38 0.28 0.34 0.38 0.96 
2009 1,472  0.30 0.09 -0.38 0.25 0.33 0.37 0.63 
2010 1,193  0.30 0.09 -0.10 0.25 0.32 0.37 0.70 
2011 1,368  0.30 0.08 0.01 0.25 0.31 0.36 0.69 
2012 1,966  0.30 0.09 -0.20 0.25 0.32 0.37 1.00 
2013 2,912  0.31 0.09 -0.12 0.26 0.32 0.37 0.99 
2014 2,659  0.31 0.09 -0.53 0.27 0.33 0.37 0.76 
2015 2,645  0.31 0.09 -0.46 0.26 0.32 0.37 0.85 
2016 1,824  0.30 0.10 -0.44 0.25 0.31 0.36 0.82 
2017 31  0.29 0.09 0.09 0.25 0.29 0.35 0.50 
Total 19,521  0.31 0.09 -0.53 0.26 0.32 0.37 1.00 
 
Type N Mean Std Dev Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
unspecified 12,661  0.31 0.08 -0.44 0.28 0.33 0.37 0.96 
GAAP 1,939  0.32 0.11 -0.20 0.26 0.34 0.38 1.00 
non-GAAP 4,418  0.29 0.09 -0.53 0.24 0.30 0.36 0.74 
cash 503  0.17 0.10 -0.07 0.10 0.15 0.23 0.50 
Total 19,521        
Note: The total number of observations in Panel C (19,950) is greater than the total number of firm-quarters with 
ETR forecasts in Panels A and B (16,127) because some firms provide more than one ETR forecast in a given 
earnings call. For example, a firm could provide both GAAP and cash ETR forecasts or provide both annual and 
quarterly ETR forecasts. In Panel D, open range and qualitative ETR forecasts are further deleted from Panel C.  
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Appendix B List of Discrete Items 
 
Under ASC 740-270, quarterly income tax provision is computed by applying an estimated 
annual ETR to year-to-date pretax income. However, income tax expense (benefit) related to a 
discrete item must be recognized in the quarter when the item occurs. We list common discrete 
items and provide some examples from conference call transcripts in this appendix. 
1) Provision-to-return adjustment 
Example: “…the provision for taxes in the third quarter was at a 29% effective tax rate, 
lower than the 33% previously forecasted, primarily due to … a provision to return true-
up related to 2007.” (Intel Corporation Q3 2008 Earnings Call) 
 
2) Changes in valuation allowance resulting from changes of expectation about future 
earnings, but not from changes of expectation about current year earnings or temporary 
book-tax difference 
Example: “Excluding the impact from additional deferred tax asset valuation allowance 
reversals, we expect to have an effective tax rate going forward of approximately 39%.” 
(Lennar Corporation Q4 2012 Earnings Call) 
 
3) Changes in tax rates 
Example: “Our effective tax rate for the quarter is 51% and for the full year it’s 64%. 
These rates are higher than our expected operational rates, primarily due to discrete 
charges related to tax rate changes…..” (Alcoa Corporation Q4 2014 Earnings Call) 
 
4) Changes in tax status 
Example: “…the resolution of some IRS audit issues helped reduce our overall effective 
income tax rate to 35.5% for the quarter.” (Dominion Resources Q2 2012 Earnings Call) 
 
5) Changes in tax laws 
Example: “What will happen in 2013 is we recorded the 2012 benefit in Q1 and then 
2013 benefit we record throughout the year, just in terms of the accounting mechanics of 
the R&D tax credit.” (Pfizer Inc. Q4 2012 Earnings Call) 
 
6) “Unusual” or “infrequent” events 
Example: “… the Harris Microwave and Stratex combination is expected to be neutral to 
fiscal 2007 earnings, excluding the anticipated integration and acquisition costs 
estimated at $0.16 per diluted share and the after tax gain to Harris that will be recorded 
in our third quarter of approximately $0.92 per diluted share. “ (Harris Corporation Q2 
2007 Earnings Call) 
 
7) Excess tax deduction from certain equity-based compensation 
Example: “Note that our GAAP earnings per share includes the impact of the early 
adoption of the new accounting standard update for share based compensation. This 
update requires excess tax benefits realized upon the settlement of a share-based 
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compensation award that flows through the earnings statement instead of the balance 
sheet… The impact on GAAP earnings per share is an increase of approximately $0.07 in 
the first quarter and $0.12 for the full year.” (Intuit Inc. Q1 2017 Earnings Call) 
 
8) Changes in assertion of indefinitely reinvested earnings in foreign subsidiaries or joint 
ventures 
Example: “During the quarter we also incurred… $42 million of income tax expense for 
planned repatriation of earnings in 2016.” (The Emerson Electric Company Q4 2015 
Earnings Call) 
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Appendix C Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition  
 
Main Variables 
 
Guide Indicator variable coded one if a firm provides voluntary annual ETR 
forecast in quarter q’s earnings call, and zero otherwise.  
 
 
NonGAAP_Guide  Indicator variable coded one if a firm provides voluntary non-GAAP 
annual ETR forecast in quarter q’s earnings call, and zero otherwise. 
Details on the classification of non-GAAP ETR forecasts are in 
Appendix A2. 
 
 
A_Rev Post-call mean analyst annual ETR forecast minus pre-call mean 
analyst annual ETR forecast. Implicit analyst annual ETR forecast is 
the difference between analyst pretax income forecast (measure = 
“PRE”) and analyst net income forecast (measure = “NET”), divided 
by analyst pretax income forecast. Analyst ETR forecasts are 
winsorized between 0 and 1. The post (pre)-call period is defined as 0 
to 45 days after (before) the conference call date.  
 
M_News Year-to-date ETR minus pre-call mean analyst annual ETR forecast. 
Year-to-date ETR is calculated as: 
∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑞
𝑞𝑞
1
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞
𝑞𝑞
1
� . Year-to-date ETR 
released in the fourth fiscal quarter earnings announcement is set to 
missing.  
 
 
V_News Voluntary annual ETR forecast minus pre-call mean analyst annual 
ETR forecast. For range forecasts, we use the midpoint value. 
Voluntary annual ETR forecast is winsorized between 0 and 1.  
 
 
A_Acc -1×|I/B/E/S actual annual ETR – post-call mean analyst annual ETR 
forecast|. Implicit I/B/E/S actual annual ETR is calculated as the 
difference between I/B/E/S actual pretax income and I/B/E/S actual 
net income, divided by I/B/E/S actual pretax income. IBES actual 
ETRs are winsorized between 0 and 1. 
 
A_AccPre -1×|I/B/E/S actual annual ETR – pre-call mean analyst annual ETR 
forecast|.  
 
M_Acc Mandatory ETR forecast accuracy, calculated as: -1×|actual IBES 
annual ETR – year-to-date ETR|.  
 
 
V_Acc -1×|actual IBES annual ETR – voluntary annual ETR forecast|.  
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Tax-related control variables 
σETR The standard deviation of quarterly ETRs over the past 12 quarters, q-
12 to q-1. Quarterly ETRs are winsorized between 0 and 1 before we 
calculate the standard deviation. 
 
∆ETR The absolute value of the change in quarterly ETR from q-1 to q. If 
fiscal quarter = 1, ∆ETR is set to zero. Quarterly ETRs are winsorized 
between 0 and 1 before we calculate the change.  
 
 
A_Accprecall -1×|I/B/E/S actual annual ETR – pre-call mean analyst annual ETR 
forecast|.  
 
BTD Total book-tax difference scaled by total assets. Total book-tax 
difference is calculated as the difference between book income and 
taxable income. Book income is pretax book income (pi). Taxable 
income is computed by grossing up the sum of the current federal tax 
expense (txfed) and current foreign tax expense (txfo), using the top 
statutory tax rate (35% during our sample period), and subtracting 
change in NOL carryforward (tlcf). Missing current foreign tax 
expense and change in NOL carryforward is set to be zero. If current 
federal tax expense is missing, total current tax expense is computed 
as total tax expense (txt) subtracting deferred taxes (txdi), state income 
taxes (txs), and other income taxes (txo).  
 
Discrete Indicator variable set to one if the difference between quarterly GAAP 
ETR and implicit I/B/E/S actual quarterly ETR differ by greater than 
0.5%, and zero otherwise.  
 
ForIncome Pretax foreign income (pifo) scaled by total assets. 
 
 
NOL Indicator variable set to one if the firm has positive net operating loss 
carryforward (tlcf) in year t-1, and zero otherwise. 
 
 
PermDiff The absolute value of the difference between 35% and quarterly ETR. 
Quarterly ETR is winsorized between 0 and 1 before we calculate the 
difference.  
 
RetroLegislation Indicator variable set to one in quarters during which Congress 
retroactively extended tax credits such as the R&D credit (i.e., quarters 
ending in the 90 days following December 20, 2006, October 3, 2008, 
December 17, 2010, January 2, 2013, December 19, 2014, and 
December 18, 2015), and zero otherwise. 
 
StockComp Stock option compensation expense (stkco+xintopt/0.65) scaled by 
total assets in year t-1. 
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TaxHaven Number of subsidiaries in tax haven countries for firm i per Exhibit 21 
disclosure in 10-K. If the firm operates domestically, TaxHaven is set 
to zero. 
  
Non-Tax Related Control Variables 
A_EPS_Rev (Post-call mean analyst EPS forecast – pre-call mean analyst EPS 
forecast) × number of shares outstanding, scaled by total assets. 
 
Coverage Number of analysts following. 
  
IMR Inverse Mills ratio from Heckman first-stage regression.  
 
IO Percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors at the 
end of quarter q. 
 
 
Leverage Sum of current and long-term debt scaled by total assets, calculated as 
sum(dlttq,dlcq)/atq for quarter q. 
 
 
Loss Indicator variable set to one if income before extraordinary items (ib) 
is negative for quarter q, and zero otherwise. 
  
MB Market-to-book ratio, calculated as abs(prccq*cshoq)/ceqq for quarter 
q. 
 
N_Disagg Number of income statement management guidance items (IBES 
Guidance measure type: CPX, EBS, EBT, EPS, FFO, GPS, GRM, 
NET, POR PRE, SAL) for fiscal year t. 
  
RD R&D (xrd) scaled by total assets measured in year t-1. RD is set to 
zero if xrd is missing.  
 
 
ROA Return on assets, calculated as income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets. 
  
Size  Natural log of total assets, calculated as log(1+atq) for quarter q. 
 
Spread Average daily bid-ask spread over the 12-month period ending on the 
last day of quarter q. Daily bid-ask spread is defined as the difference 
between ask price and bid price divided by the midpoint of the ask and 
bid price.  
 
StdRet The standard deviation of monthly return over the 12-month period 
that ends on the last day of quarter q.  
 
V_EPS_News (Management annual EPS guidance - pre-call consensus analyst 
annual EPS forecast) × number of shares outstanding, scaled by total 
assets. 
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Figure 1 Timeline 
 
Panel A: Timeline of management voluntary ETR forecast, mandatory ETR forecast, and analyst 
ETR forecast  
 
 
 
 
Panel B: The incidence of voluntary and mandatory ETR forecasts throughout the year 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Panel A presents the timeline of management voluntary ETR forecast, mandatory ETR forecast, analyst ETR 
forecast, and pre- and post-conference call periods. Panel B shows the timing of voluntary and mandatory ETR 
forecasts for a calendar-year firm. Under the integral method, year-to-date ETRs in the first, second, and third fiscal 
quarters of year t represent firms’ expected annual ETR in year t. However, in the fourth fiscal quarter, the year-to-
date ETR is the actual realized annual ETR in year t, and it no longer represents a forecast. For example, in the 
2010Q4 earnings call, the firm issues voluntary ETR forecast for fiscal 2011, and no mandatory ETR forecast is 
available. In 2011Q1 earnings call, the firm issues voluntary ETR forecast for fiscal 2011, and the year-to-date ETR 
represents a de facto mandatory ETR forecast for 2011. Similarly, in 2011Q2 and 2011Q3 earnings, the firm issues 
voluntary ETR forecasts for fiscal 2011, and the year-to-date ETRs represent mandatory ETR forecasts for fiscal 
2011. When estimating Eq. (2), we only retain ETR forecasts issued in the first, second, and third fiscal quarter 
earnings announcements (shaded area in Panel B).  
 
  
49 
 
Table 1 Sample Construction 
 
  
 # Firm-quarters 
Compustat Fundamentals Quarterly, U.S.-based firms (2006-2016) with 
conference call transcripts 77,181 
Deleting observations with missing tax complexity and control variables  (32,798) 
Baseline sample in the determinant model 44,383 
      Observations with voluntary annual ETR forecasts  10,02725 
      Observations with unspecified voluntary annual ETR forecasts 7,170 
      Observations with GAAP voluntary annual ETR forecasts 950 
      Observations with non-GAAP voluntary annual ETR forecasts 2,212 
  
Observations with voluntary annual ETR forecasts 10,027 
Drop observations with missing post-call analyst ETR forecast (873) 
Drop fourth-quarter observations and observations with missing mandatory 
ETR forecasts (2,677) 
Sample in analyst ETR revision and accuracy tests 6,477 
      Observations with unspecified voluntary annual ETR forecasts 4,589 
      Observations with GAAP voluntary annual ETR forecasts 606 
      Observations with non-GAAP voluntary annual ETR forecasts 1,496 
 
  
                                                          
25 A small number of firms provide more than one type of ETR guidance in an earnings call, thus 10,027 is smaller 
than 7,170 + 950 + 2,212. 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Variables used in the determinant model 
 N Mean Std Dev P25 Median P75 
Guide 44,383 0.226 0.418 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NonGAAP_Guide 44,383 0.050 0.218 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Tax Complexity Measures 
∆ETR 44,383 0.051 0.101 0.000 0.011 0.049 
σETR 44,383 0.082 0.076 0.024 0.058 0.117 
PermDiff 44,383 0.113 0.125 0.025 0.058 0.158 
Discrete 44,383 0.468 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 
NOL 44,383 0.485 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 
RetroLegislation 44,383 0.149 0.356 0.000 0.000 0.000 
StockComp 44,383 0.008 0.012 0.001 0.004 0.009 
BTD 44,383 0.022 0.078 0.002 0.020 0.045 
ForIncome 44,383 0.021 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.032 
TaxHaven 44,383 1.624 2.796 0.000 0.000 2.000 
 
Operation Complexity Measures 
Leverage 44,383 0.241 0.202 0.070 0.212 0.363 
Loss 44,383 0.010 0.101 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MB 44,383 3.124 5.048 1.413 2.245 3.709 
RD 44,383 0.019 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.019 
ROA 44,383 0.017 0.015 0.006 0.014 0.024 
Size 44,383 8.008 1.791 6.779 7.983 9.144 
       
Information Environment and Disclosure Practice Measures 
Coverage 44,383 10.654 7.829 4.000 9.000 16.000 
IO 44,383 0.392 0.412 0.000 0.176 0.825 
Spread 44,383 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.001 
StdRet 44,383 0.092 0.053 0.057 0.079 0.112 
N_Disagg 44,383 0.444 1.111 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Additional variables used in analyst ETR revision and accuracy tests 
 N Mean 
Std 
Dev P25 P50 P75 
Mandatory ETR forecast 6,477 0.304 0.106 0.255 0.318 0.365 
Voluntary ETR forecast 6,477 0.313 0.073 0.273 0.320 0.365 
Voluntary ETR forecast (non-GAAP) 1,496 0.294 0.073 0.250 0.300 0.350 
Voluntary ETR forecast (GAAP) 606 0.326 0.095 0.280 0.340 0.380 
Voluntary ETR forecast (Unspecified) 4,589 0.315 0.070 0.280 0.327 0.365 
Analyst ETR forecastpre-call 5,890 0.310 0.080 0.269 0.323 0.366 
Analyst ETR forecastpost-call 6,477 0.307 0.084 0.264 0.319 0.363 
IBES implicit actual ETR 6,477 0.301 0.094 0.257 0.316 0.361 
M_News 5,890 -0.008 0.088 -0.029 -0.006 0.010 
V_News 5,890 0.001 0.056 -0.012 -0.001 0.008 
V_News (non-GAAP) 1,354 0.004 0.050 -0.010 0.000 0.013 
V_News (GAAP) 557 0.029 0.103 -0.011 0.001 0.040 
V_News (Unspecified) 4,182 -0.003 0.048 -0.012 -0.001 0.005 
A_Rev 5,890 -0.004 0.036 -0.011 -0.002 0.004 
M_Acc 6,477 -0.049 0.084 -0.052 -0.019 -0.007 
V_Acc 6,477 -0.035 0.059 -0.035 -0.013 -0.005 
V_Acc (non-GAAP) 1,496 -0.035 0.061 -0.036 -0.013 -0.005 
V_Acc (GAAP) 606 -0.056 0.091 -0.060 -0.018 -0.006 
V_Acc (Unspecified) 4,589 -0.032 0.052 -0.033 -0.013 -0.005 
A_Acc 6,477 -0.033 0.057 -0.033 -0.013 -0.005 
A_Accprecall 5,890 -0.035 0.057 -0.037 -0.015 -0.006 
IMR 6,477 2.802 4.999 0.554 0.707 3.878 
A_EPS_Rev 6,473 0.000 0.007 -0.001 0.000 0.002 
V_EPS_News 3,802 0.000 0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.001 
Note: Variable definitions are listed in Appendix C. All continuous variables (except for ETRs) are winsorized at 1% 
tails. 
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Table 3 The Determinants of Issuing Voluntary ETR Forecasts (H1) 
 (1) (2) 
 Guide NonGAAP_Guide 
Tax Complexity   
∆ETR  0.255*** 0.135 
 (0.095) (0.213) 
σETR 0.081 0.582* 
 (0.147) (0.335) 
PermDiff -0.236** 0.840*** 
 (0.112) (0.216) 
Discrete 0.059*** 0.271*** 
 (0.021) (0.045) 
NOL  0.084*** -0.034 
 (0.026) (0.055) 
RetroLegislation 0.028 -0.035 
 (0.024) (0.047) 
StockComp  -0.215 3.077 
 (1.160) (2.628) 
BTD -0.011 -0.068 
 (0.129) (0.267) 
ForIncome 1.068*** 0.244 
 (0.389) (0.748) 
TaxHaven 0.019*** 0.015 
 (0.005) (0.009) 
Operation Complexity   
Leverage -0.087 0.120 
 (0.076) (0.170) 
Loss 0.054 -0.208 
 (0.092) (0.190) 
MB 0.004** -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
RD -0.327 2.133*** 
 (0.399) (0.792) 
ROA 0.215 -5.074*** 
 (0.863) (1.949) 
Size -0.028** 0.016 
 (0.013) (0.030) 
Information Environment and Disclosure Practice   
Coverage 0.005* -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.005) 
IO 0.043 -0.049 
 (0.032) (0.065) 
Spread -38.929*** -67.398*** 
 (8.112) (21.718) 
StdRet -0.415* 0.022 
 (0.238) (0.609) 
Guideq-1 1.282*** 1.808*** 
 (0.026) (0.060) 
N_Disagg 0.077*** -0.020 
 (0.012) (0.024) 
Constant -1.685*** -2.027*** 
 (0.241) (0.614) 
   
Observations 44,383 10,026 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 3 (cont’d) 
 
Cluster Firm Firm 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Quarter FE Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.229 0.295 
This table presents the results of estimating Eq. (1). The dependent variable is the issuance of voluntary (non-GAAP) 
annual ETR forecast in a given quarter - Guide (NonGAAP_Guide) – in Column 1 (2). In Column 1, the sample 
consists of firms with and without voluntary ETR forecasts. In Column 2, the sample only includes firm-quarters 
with voluntary annual ETR forecasts. Variable definitions are listed in Appendix C. Numbers in parentheses are 
robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
levels, respectively, using one-tailed test when there is a directional prediction and two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 4 The Incremental Informativeness of Voluntary ETR Forecasts: The Relation 
Between News in Voluntary ETR Forecasts and Analyst ETR Revisions (H2) 
 
 DV = A_Rev 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All types Non-GAAP GAAP Unspecified 
     
V_News 0.185*** 0.244*** 0.149** 0.151*** 
 (0.027) (0.056) (0.061) (0.038) 
M_News 0.047** 0.011 0.121** 0.069*** 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.057) (0.025) 
∆ETR  -0.000 0.020 0.005 -0.009 
 (0.013) (0.022) (0.034) (0.015) 
σETR 0.001 0.009 0.052 -0.004 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.051) (0.011) 
PermDiff -0.030** -0.019 0.057 -0.046*** 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.034) (0.017) 
Discrete -0.001 -0.002 -0.007 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) 
NOL  -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.001) 
RetroLegislation -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) 
StockComp  0.156 0.129 0.446 0.063 
 (0.129) (0.254) (0.337) (0.066) 
BTD 0.043 0.057 0.002 0.031 
 (0.029) (0.043) (0.040) (0.027) 
ForIncome 0.037* 0.059 0.018 0.043** 
 (0.019) (0.037) (0.092) (0.020) 
TaxHaven 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.011*** -0.017* -0.041* -0.009** 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.021) (0.004) 
Loss 0.046*** 0.042* -0.021 0.052*** 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.052) (0.017) 
MB -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RD -0.040 -0.037 -0.232** -0.011 
 (0.027) (0.054) (0.108) (0.022) 
ROA 0.007 0.018 0.433** -0.036 
 (0.069) (0.174) (0.202) (0.055) 
Size 0.001 0.001 0.008** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Coverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IO -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) 
Spread 0.177 11.416* 0.845 -0.906 
 (1.030) (6.553) (2.351) (0.961) 
StdRet -0.041** -0.045 -0.086* -0.044** 
 (0.019) (0.038) (0.048) (0.022) 
Guideq-1 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) 
 (continued on next page) 
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Table 4 (cont’d) 
 
InvMills -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant 0.001 -0.011 -0.069* 0.007 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.039) (0.011) 
     
Test: V_News = M_News p-value = 0.001 p-value = 0.001 p-value = 0.803 p-value = 0.166 
     
Observations 6,140 1,394 574 4,379 
R-squared 0.143 0.163 0.275 0.156 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents the results of estimating Eq. (2). Column 1 is estimated using voluntary annual ETR forecasts 
issued in the first, second, and third fiscal quarter earnings conference calls (see Figure 1 Panel B). Columns 2-4 are 
estimated using subsamples of firm-quarters with voluntary annual non-GAAP, GAAP, and unspecified ETR 
forecasts, respectively. Variable definitions are listed in Appendix C. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard 
errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, 
using one-tailed test when there is a directional prediction and two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 5 The Incremental Informativeness of Voluntary ETR Forecasts – The Role of 
Discrete Tax Items (H3)  
 
Panel A. Firm-quarters with discrete items  
 DV = A_Rev 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES All Types non-GAAP GAAP Unspecified 
     
V_News 0.207*** 0.303*** 0.156** 0.170*** 
 (0.029) (0.059) (0.074) (0.042) 
M_News 0.032* 0.012 0.121* 0.036 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.065) (0.027) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Test: V_News = M_News p-value = 0.000 p-value = 0.000 p-value = 0.791 p-value = 0.034 
     
Observations 3,144 982 373 1,951 
R-squared 0.152 0.208 0.320 0.141 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B. Firm-quarters without discrete items 
 DV = A_Rev 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES All Types non-GAAP GAAP Unspecified 
     
V_News 0.156*** 0.070 0.106 0.135*** 
 (0.042) (0.103) (0.092) (0.042) 
M_News 0.089* 0.025 0.238*** 0.130*** 
 (0.049) (0.070) (0.056) (0.031) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Test: V_News = M_News p-value = 0.404 p-value = 0.771 p-value = 0.278 p-value = 0.927 
     
Observations 2,996 412 201 2,428 
R-squared 0.183 0.381 0.618 0.254 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents the results of estimating Eq. (2). Panel A (B) is estimated in the subsample where the quarterly 
actual GAAP ETR differs from the actual ETR inferred from IBES by more (less) than 0.5%. In both panels, 
Column 1 is estimated using voluntary annual ETR forecasts issued in the first, second, and third fiscal quarter 
earnings conference calls (see Figure 1 Panel B). Columns 2-4 are estimated using subsamples of firm-quarters with 
voluntary annual non-GAAP, GAAP, and unspecified ETR forecasts, respectively. Variable definitions are listed in 
Appendix C. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using one-tailed test when there is a directional prediction 
and two-tailed test otherwise.   
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Table 6 The Incremental Informativeness of Voluntary ETR Forecasts – Non-Mimicking 
Analyst ETR Forecast Subsample  
 
 DV = A_Rev 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES All Types non-GAAP GAAP Unspecified 
     
V_News 0.181*** 0.252*** 0.149** 0.136*** 
 (0.028) (0.060) (0.063) (0.041) 
M_News 0.044** 0.016 0.122** 0.064** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.060) (0.026) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Test: V_News = M_News p-value = 0.002 p-value = 0.001 p-value = 0.819 p-value = 0.247 
     
Observations 4,653 1,203 482 3,153 
R-squared 0.137 0.178 0.281 0.143 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents the results of estimating Eq. (2) using the subsample where analyst consensus ETR forecast 
differs from mandatory ETR forecast by more than 0.5%. Column 1 is estimated using voluntary annual ETR 
forecasts issued in the first, second, and third fiscal quarter earnings conference calls (see Figure 1 Panel B). 
Columns 2-4 are estimated using subsamples of firm-quarters with voluntary annual non-GAAP, GAAP, and 
unspecified ETR forecasts, respectively. Variable definitions are listed in Appendix C. Numbers in parentheses are 
robust standard errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, 
using one-tailed test when there is a directional prediction and two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 7 Voluntary ETR Forecast Accuracy and Analyst ETR Forecast Accuracy 
 
 DV = A_Acc 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES All Types non-GAAP GAAP Unspecified 
     
V_Acc 0.073*** 0.135*** 0.091* 0.079** 
 (0.028) (0.052) (0.054) (0.039) 
M_Acc 0.083*** 0.053*** -0.063 0.118*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.048) (0.025) 
A_Accpre-call 0.719*** 0.683*** 0.569*** 0.729*** 
 (0.028) (0.052) (0.078) (0.035) 
∆ETR  -0.005 0.013 0.010 -0.007 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.022) (0.012) 
σETR -0.000 -0.007 0.043 -0.000 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.042) (0.010) 
PermDiff 0.029*** 0.007 -0.015 0.043*** 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.029) (0.009) 
Discrete 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) 
NOL  0.001 0.003 0.006 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) 
RetroLegislation 0.000 -0.001 -0.006 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) 
StockComp  -0.012 -0.146 -0.212 0.053 
 (0.087) (0.168) (0.287) (0.063) 
BTD -0.015 -0.039 -0.012 0.002 
 (0.012) (0.025) (0.013) (0.008) 
ForIncome -0.002 0.032 0.126* -0.012 
 (0.011) (0.027) (0.071) (0.012) 
TaxHaven -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.006* 0.006 -0.021 -0.007* 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.016) (0.003) 
Loss -0.001 0.017 -0.078** -0.005 
 (0.012) (0.019) (0.032) (0.015) 
MB 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RD 0.022 0.071** -0.026 -0.028 
 (0.018) (0.035) (0.077) (0.018) 
ROA 0.067* 0.006 0.325 0.078* 
 (0.040) (0.089) (0.197) (0.041) 
Size 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Coverage -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IO -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) 
Spread -0.162 -4.163 1.780 0.355 
 (0.720) (4.807) (1.848) (0.733) 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 7 (cont’d) 
 
StdRet -0.032** -0.029 -0.094** -0.014 
 (0.014) (0.035) (0.041) (0.014) 
Guideq-1 0.001 0.003 0.012** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) 
InvMills 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant 0.002 -0.001 -0.030 -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.029) (0.007) 
     
Test: V_Acc = M_Acc p-value = 0.786 p-value = 0.157 p-value = 0.088 p-value = 0.503 
     
Observations 5,890 1,354 557 4,182 
R-squared 0.737 0.752 0.601 0.777 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents the results of estimating Eq. (2). We replace the dependent variable in Eq. (2) with post-call 
analyst ETR forecast accuracy (A_Acc). The independent variables – V_News and M_News – are replaced with 
voluntary ETR forecast accuracy (V_Acc) and mandatory ETR forecast accuracy (M_Acc). We additionally control 
for pre-call analyst ETR forecast accuracy (A_Accprecall). Column 1 is estimated using voluntary annual ETR 
forecasts issued in the first, second, and third fiscal quarter earnings conference calls (see Figure 1 Panel B). 
Columns 2-4 are estimated using subsamples of firm-quarters with voluntary annual non-GAAP, GAAP, and 
unspecified ETR forecasts, respectively. Variable definitions are listed in Appendix C. Numbers in parentheses are 
robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
levels, respectively, using one-tailed test when there is a directional prediction and two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 8 The Incremental Informativeness of Voluntary ETR Forecasts – Controlling for 
Management EPS Guidance and Analyst EPS Forecasts 
 
 DV = A_Rev 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES All Types Non-GAAP GAAP Unspecified 
     
V_News 0.244*** 0.326*** 0.205** 0.225*** 
 (0.031) (0.074) (0.080) (0.045) 
M_News 0.040*** 0.036* 0.095 0.041*** 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.071) (0.014) 
A_EPS_Rev -0.527*** -0.574* -1.060 -0.379*** 
 (0.147) (0.309) (0.709) (0.136) 
V_EPS_News -0.110 -0.055 -0.006 -0.149 
 (0.158) (0.471) (0.814) (0.159) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Test: V_News = M_News p-value = 0.000 p-value = 0.000 p-value = 0.429 p-value = 0.000 
     
Observations 3,621 863 351 2,562 
R-squared 0.202 0.279 0.332 0.202 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents the results of estimating Eq. (2). We additionally control for analyst EPS forecast revision 
(A_EPS_Rev) and news in management EPS guidance (V_EPS_News). Column 1 is estimated using voluntary 
annual ETR forecasts issued in the first, second, and third fiscal quarter earnings conference calls (see Figure 1 
Panel B). Columns 2-4 are estimated using subsamples of firm-quarters with voluntary annual non-GAAP, GAAP, 
and unspecified ETR forecasts, respectively. Variable definitions are listed in Appendix C. Numbers in parentheses 
are robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
levels, respectively, using one-tailed test when there is a directional prediction and two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 9 The Incremental Informativeness of Voluntary ETR Forecasts: The Effect of 
Voluntary ETR Forecast Timing and Frequency 
 
Panel A. Early- vs. late-within-year voluntary ETR forecasts  
 DV= A_Rev 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 
    
V_News 0.225*** 0.132*** 0.180*** 
 (0.039) (0.036) (0.052) 
M_News 0.029 0.091*** 0.037 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.047) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
    
Test: V_News = M_News p-value = 0.000 p-value = 0.439 p-value = 0.117 
    
Observations 1,988 2,162 1,990 
R-squared 0.190 0.189 0.137 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter FE No No No 
 
Panel B. Frequency of issuing voluntary ETR forecasts  
 DV = A_Rev 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Frequent Issuers Sporadic Issuers 
   
V_News 0.216*** 0.176*** 
 (0.039) (0.031) 
M_News 0.032 0.052** 
 (0.025) (0.023) 
Controls Yes Yes 
   
Test: V_News = M_News p-value = 0.000 p-value = 0.012 
   
Observations 2,441 3,699 
R-squared 0.175 0.145 
Cluster Firm Firm 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Quarter FE Yes Yes 
This table presents the results of Eq. (2) estimated using various subsamples. In Panel A, Columns 1-3 report results 
estimated using voluntary ETR forecasts issued in the first, second, and third fiscal quarter earnings conference calls, 
respectively (see Figure 1 Panel B). In Panel B, Column 1 (2) reports results for frequent (sporadic) issuers. 
Frequent (sporadic) issuers are defined as firms providing voluntary ETR forecasts more than (smaller than or equal 
to) twice during the prior four quarters. Variable definitions are listed in Appendix C. Numbers in parentheses are 
robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
levels, respectively, using one-tailed test when there is a directional prediction and two-tailed test otherwise.  
